ÿWPCc òRÊêà ˆØ)o°è^Æ»¼ ˆØ\‡¦2ó%`'\Me`mÙÉ‚ìiVG•åe™Ñ[ Ã3âa‚Ó³%y§ÈÕL›&œüÿÞ? ¿s´¨ZÖq]ô•¢ÃÚ1½æ}}&û;f×`öŸ±ÅZžQ¡ä^ŽÔí&@ï}=×^™Æ6£‰Žã¥Ïœ‰•€ÉQè2™¸vùDb‰$ÈàIJöàÁý:ÙaY®(­v’é,µëg¿1³ÈÔz?]JFŠløiëµA hV„W#!ÂUNã %1 0(7^ _w@k4«¿Î mÐç 0l 0Do ø³ 1« UNÜ <* ÞffNDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD BF˜HP LaserJet 5Si,ä,,,,,ä0(ÈhH  Z6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡|›8/ä * U+ U, U- U. U/ U0 1 U2 D3 Uvî.pz¤L‘3|x3 ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àThe€ideas€expressed€in€this€section€are€drawn€from€an€outstanding€brief€preparedÐ ° Ðby€attorneys€Donald€Ô_ÔHorganÔ_Ô€and€Dennis€Riordan.((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó îÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àThe€author€acknowledges€the€efforts€of€attorney€George€Ô_ÔSchraerÔ_Ô€who€found€theseÐ ° Ðcases.òòóó 'Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àAs€was€discussed€above,€specific€instances€of€the€defendantððs€conduct€areÐ ° Ðadmissible€as€òòrebuttalóó€evidence.€€(òòPeople€v.€Callahan,€supraóó,€74€Cal.App.4th€356,€378„379.)(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular  SARTMcAlpinBledsoeFalsettaviolativetouchingsEwoldtFeggansestoppedsociopathic t]heRandleconsensuallycriminalistDaubertMerrellZuckermanw]hereSergillnonhearsaydispositive I]fCSAASr]elatedNewkirkBolinDunkleHousley suaspontePagalingMcFarlandStollDaggettLaJoied]efendantSchollEcclestanStritzingerdeclarantN.C.AppMichaelsNoonan CeciL.Rev BainCriscionedimunitione]xclusion TranMcKinneyRoblieg]ivenFilsonOzuna EppsreadbackPearchj]urorLeMonsThompkinsSpearmanRuckert]hereWoodardGerlaugh ÔÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àUnder€the€1996€amendment€to€the€federal€habeas€statute,€relief€may€be€grantedÐ ° Ðonly€when€the€state€court€judgment€is€contrary€to€ð ðclearly€established€Federal€law,€as€determinedÏby€the€Supreme€Court€of€the€United€States;€.€.€.€.ðð€€(28€U.S.C.€section€2254(d)(1).)€€This€provisionÏrefers€ð ðto€the€holdingsðð€of€Supreme€Court€cases.€€(òòWilliams€v.€Tayloróó€(2000)€529€U.S.€362,€412.)Ð €Ð ÐHowever,€a€defendant€may€nonetheless€seek€relief€by€ð ðthe€extension€of€Supreme€Court€precedentÏto€a€new€area,€.€.€.€.ðð€€(òòVan€Tran€v.€Lindseyóó€(9th€Cir.€2000)€212€F.3d€1143,€1154,€fn.€16.) dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  ÓÑ8€¾¯XdðdÈ8Ñà@]]ìàò òEVIDENTIARY€ISSUES€FREQUENTLY€à@@ee ìàARISING€IN€SEX€CASESó óˆÐ ° ÐÌBy:€€Dallas€Ô_ÔSacherÔ_ÔÌÌò òIntroductionó óÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àAs€all€experienced€criminal€defense€lawyers€know,€it€is€extremely€difficult€to€handle€a€caseÏwhere€the€client€has€been€charged€with€a€serious€sex€offense.€€Due€to€the€nature€of€the€charge,€manyÏjurors€instinctively€presume€that€the€defendant€is€guilty.€€Moreover,€the€Legislature€and€appellateÏcourts€have€devised€a€set€of€rules€which€€make€it€tremendously€hard€to€obtain€a€fair€trialÌÌà  àOnce€a€defendant€is€convicted,€it€becomes€even€more€difficult€to€obtain€an€appellate€remedy.€ÏIn€an€era€of€hot€button€politics,€appellate€judges€are€loathe€to€provide€relief€to€a€defendant€who€isÏdespised€by€a€majority€of€the€citizenry.ÌÌà  àGiven€this€reality,€appellate€counsel€must€display€extraordinary€skill€and€desire€in€order€toÏpersuade€an€appellate€court€that€a€new€trial€must€be€ordered€in€a€sex€case.€€Although€appellateÏcounsel€is€certain€to€be€disappointed€by€the€result€in€a€great€many€cases,€it€is€nonetheless€true€thatÏa€large€number€of€evidentiary€issues€are€potentially€available€in€a€sex€case.ÌÌà  àThe€purpose€of€this€article€is€twofold.€€First,€the€general€rules€of€law€concerning€gardenÏvariety€evidentiary€issues€will€be€discussed.€€It€is€hoped€that€the€reader€will€thereby€obtain€aÏbackground€in€the€relevant€black€letter€law.€Second,€and€more€importantly,€the€attached€habeasÏpetition€provides€a€real€life€exploration€of€many€of€the€rules€of€evidence€peculiar€to€sex€cases.€€€ByÏviewing€the€issues€in€the€context€of€an€actual€case,€counsel€should€obtain€a€greater€understanding€ofÏthe€application€of€the€law.ÌÌà  àA€final€introductory€word€is€in€order.€€Having€read€many€transcripts€in€sex€cases,€I€haveÏreached€the€unfortunate€conclusion€that€a€substantial€number€of€trial€lawyers€are€woefully€ignorantÏof€the€rules€of€evidence€as€they€apply€to€sex€charges.€€Trial€counsel€often€fail€to€make€appropriateÏobjections€and€ignore€helpful€evidence€which€they€could€have€presented.€Thus,€it€is€often€necessaryÏto€pursue€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€in€order€to€reach€the€merits€of€evidentiaryÏissues.€€Indeed,€the€attached€habeas€petition€reveals€a€textbook€example€of€the€fact€that€many€sexÏdefendants€are€betrayed€by€the€ignorance€of€their€own€lawyer.ÌÌò òI.€€à8  àWHEN€FACED€WITH€AN€ISSUE€ARISING€UNDER€EVIDENCE€CODEÐ €%Ð # ÐSECTION€1108,€COUNSEL€MUST€ENGAGE€IN€A€SKILLFUL€USE€OF€THEÏRECORD.ó óÐ`'°"%Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€1995,€the€Legislature€enacted€Evidence€Code€section€1108€which€allows€for€the€admissionÏof€any€uncharged€ð ðsexual€offenseðð€when€the€present€charge€involves€a€major€sex€crime.€The€termÏð ðsexual€offenseðð€has€an€incredibly€broad€meaning€which€includes€circumstances€where€the€defendantÏmerely€conspired€to€assist€in€a€sex€crime€and€did€not€actually€perform€the€sex€act€himself.€€(SectionÐ ,`'* Ð1108,€subd.€(d)(1)(E).)ÌÌà  àAs€our€Supreme€Court€has€acknowledged,€section€1108€was€intended€to€allow€juries€toÏconsider€the€defendantððs€propensity€to€commit€sex€crimes.€€(òòPeople€v.€Falsettaóó€(1999)€21€Cal.4thÐ €Ð Ð903,€907.)€€Under€section€1108,€the€trier€of€fact€may€consider€the€defendantððs€commission€of€a€priorÏsex€crime€ð ðððððas€evidence€of€the€defendantððs€disposition€to€commit€such€crimes,€and€for€its€bearingÏon€the€probability€or€improbability€that€the€defendant€has€been€falsely€or€mistakenly€accused€of€suchÏan€offense.ðððð€€[Citation.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€912.)€Ð @  ÐÌà  àRemarkably,€the€California€Supreme€Court€has€unanimously€held€that€section€1108€is€notÏviolative€of€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€federal€Constitution.€€(òòFalsetta,€supra,€óó21€Cal.4th€903,Ð `  Ð910„922.)€€To€date,€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€has€not€weighed€in€on€this€issue.€While€it€is€unlikely€thatÏthe€U.S.€Supreme€Court€will€take€a€section€1108€case€at€this€late€date,€there€is€nothing€to€be€lost€byÏpreserving€a€federal€due€process€challenge€to€the€statute.€€Since€your€client€may€well€be€serving€aÏlife€sentence,€it€would€certainly€be€reasonable€to€file€a€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari€regarding€theÏconstitutionality€of€section€1108.ÌÌà  àAside€from€a€due€process€challenge,€there€are€only€two€conceivable€avenues€of€appellateÏrelief€when€section€1108€evidence€has€been€admitted€at€trial:€€(1)€the€prosecutor€failed€to€provideÏsufficient€notice€of€the€propensity€evidence;€and€(2)€the€evidence€should€have€been€excluded€underÏEvidence€Code€section€352.€€As€will€be€discussed€below,€the€first€theory€will€almost€never€prevail,Ïbut€there€is€hope€under€section€352€in€an€appropriate€case.ÌÌà  àSection€1108,€subd.€(b)€provides€that€the€prosecutor€must€disseminate€written€discovery€toÏthe€defense€ð ðat€least€30€days€before€the€scheduled€date€of€trial€or€at€such€later€time€as€the€court€mayÏallow€for€good€cause.ðð€€If€the€prosecutor€provided€late€discovery€and€defense€counsel€objected,€thisÏis€certainly€a€potentially€worthy€issue€for€appeal.€€Of€course,€the€strength€of€the€issue€will€dependÏupon€the€record€made€below€(i.e.€if€the€prosecutor€had€no€excuse€for€failing€to€provide€timelyÏdiscovery,€the€court€may€have€erred€in€allowing€use€of€the€evidence).ÌÌà  àIt€should€be€noted€that€California€law€specifically€provides€that€evidence€may€be€excludedÏfor€a€willful€discovery€violation.€€(Penal€Code€section€1054.5,€subd.€(b);€òòPeople€v.€Hammondóó€(1994)Ð À! Ð22€Cal.App.4th€1611,€1623„1624.)€€Thus,€if€the€prosecutor€has€played€fast€and€loose,€a€viable€issueÏmay€exist.€€However,€it€is€highly€unlikely€that€an€appellate€court€will€find€reversible€error€due€to€aÏdiscovery€violation€absent€an€unusually€egregious€set€of€facts.€€(òòPeople€v.€Gonzalesóó€(1994)€22Ð $à" ÐCal.App.4th€1744,€1747;€ð ðprohibiting€the€testimony€of€a€witness€is€not€an€appropriate€discoveryÏsanction€in€a€criminal€case€absent€a€showing€of€significant€prejudice€and€of€willful€conduct.ðð)ÌÌà  àSection€1108,€subd.€(a)€specifically€provides€that€otherwise€admissible€propensity€evidenceÏmay€be€rendered€ð ðinadmissible€pursuant€to€Section€352.ðð€€In€exercising€its€discretion€under€sectionÏ352,€the€trial€court€is€to€consider€several€factors:ÌÌà8  àð ðRather€than€admit€or€exclude€every€sex€offense€a€defendant€commits,€trial€judgesÐ ,`'* Ðmust€consider€such€factors€as€its€nature,€relevance,€and€possible€remoteness,€theÏdegree€of€certainty€of€its€commission€and€the€likelihood€of€confusing,€misleading,€orÏdistracting€the€jurors€from€their€main€inquiry,€its€similarity€to€the€charged€offense,Ïits€likely€prejudicial€impact€on€the€jurors,€the€burden€on€the€defendant€in€defendingÏagainst€the€uncharged€offense,€and€the€availability€of€less€prejudicial€alternatives€toÏits€outright€admission,€such€as€admitting€some€but€not€all€of€the€defendantððs€other€sexÏoffenses,€or€excluding€irrelevant€though€inflammatory€details€surrounding€theÏoffense.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€Falsetta,€supraóó,€21€Cal.4th€903,€917.)Ð@ Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àObviously,€every€section€352€issue€must€be€litigated€with€reference€to€the€details€of€the€case.€ÏHowever,€given€the€highly€inflammatory€nature€of€propensity€evidence,€a€persuasive€argument€canÏoften€be€made€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€certain€evidence.€€Although€existing€case€lawÏis€not€particularly€helpful,€there€is€at€least€one€Court€of€Appeal€opinion€which€demonstrates€theÏmanner€in€which€a€section€352€claim€should€be€made.ÌÌà  àIn€òòPeople€v.€Harrisóó€(1998)€60€Cal.App.4th€727,€the€defendant€was€employed€as€a€mentalÐ À Ðhealth€nurse.€€He€was€accused€of€committing€various€sexual€touchings€of€two€female€patients.ÏDefendant€relied€on€the€defense€of€consent€as€to€one€woman€and€denied€that€he€committed€any€actsÏagainst€the€second€woman.€€Over€a€section€352€objection,€the€prosecutor€was€allowed€to€introduceÏa€ð ðsanitizedðð€version€of€the€facts€underlying€the€defendantððs€1972€conviction€for€first€degree€burglaryÏwith€great€bodily€injury.€€Essentially,€the€jury€learned€that€the€police€went€to€the€home€of€a€23€yearÏold€woman€and€found€that€she€was€bleeding€from€the€vagina.€€The€defendant€had€blood€on€his€penisÏand€underwear.ÌÌà  àIn€holding€that€the€evidence€should€have€been€excluded€under€section€352,€the€òòHarris€óó€courtÐ 0€ Ðmade€several€findings:€€(1)€the€evidence€was€highly€inflammatory€since€it€included€a€violent€attackÏon€a€person€whom€the€jury€would€have€presumed€to€be€a€stranger€to€the€defendant;€(2)€the€jury€wouldÏhave€been€confused€since€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€burglary€instead€of€rape;€(3)€the€crime€wasÏremote€since€it€was€23€years€old;€and€(4)€the€evidence€was€not€probative.€€(òòHarris,€supraóó,€60Ð ð@ ÐCal.App.4th€at€pp.€737„741.)€€€Regarding€the€last€factor,€the€court€reasoned:ÌÌà8  àð ðThe€prior€conduct€evidence€is€so€totally€dissimilar€to€the€current€allegations€that€theÏtrial€courtððs€finding€that€it€was€very€probative€fails€to€answer€the€question:€€ProbativeÐ °"  Ðòòof€whatóó?€€The€trial€court€pointed€to€the€fact€all€3€women€were€Caucasian€and€in€theirÐ  #ð! Ð20ððs€or€30ððs.€These€ððsimilaritiesðð€are€not€significant.€€The€defendant€is€also€CaucasianÏand€the€ðð20ððs€or€30ððsðð€is€a€wide€age€group€that€includes€the€majority€of€the€victimsÏof€sexual€assaults.€€This€altered€version€of€a€23„year„old€act€of€inexplicable€sexualÏviolence€while€heavy€with€ððundue€prejudiceðð€and€dangerous€in€the€hands€of€a€juryÏwas€not€particularly€probative€of€the€defendantððs€predisposition€to€commit€theseÏððbreach€of€trustðð€sex€crimes.ðð€€(òòHarris,€supraóó,€60€Cal.App.4th€at€pp.€740„741,Ð @)$' Ðemphasis€in€original.)Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAs€the€foregoing€quote€demonstrates,€a€key€factor€in€a€persuasive€section€352€argument€isÐ ,`'* Ðany€significant€degree€of€dissimilarity€between€the€propensity€evidence€and€the€present€offense.€€InÐ ° ÐòòHarrisóó,€there€was€a€vast€difference€between€the€egregious€prior€crime€(a€vicious€rape)€and€the€presentÐ  ð Ðcrimes€(non„violent€touchings€of€the€breasts€and€vagina).€€Since€there€are€often€significant€factualÏdistinctions€between€sex€crimes,€òòHarrisóó€shows€that€a€viable€section€352€argument€can€often€be€made.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThe€central€point€concerning€any€section€352€analysis€is€that€defense€counsel€must€pay€closeÏattention€to€the€facts.€Even€the€worst€record€will€include€some€facts€which€are€helpful.€€For€example,Ïif€the€present€and€past€crimes€are€fairly€similar,€it€may€be€that€the€prior€offense€is€remote€in€time.€ÏOr,€it€might€be€that€the€defendant€escaped€conviction€in€the€past.€€(òòPeople€v.€Ewoldtóó€(1994)€7€Cal.4thÐ 0 € Ð380,€405;€the€prejudicial€effect€of€character€evidence€is€heightened€if€the€defendantððs€ð ðuncharged€actsÏdid€not€result€in€criminal€convictions.ðð)€€By€massaging€the€positive€facts€in€a€record,€counsel€canÏoften€make€a€credible€section€352€argument.à À àÐ P  ÐÌà  àIn€so€doing,€it€should€be€emphasized€that€sex€crimes€quite€naturally€evoke€strong€emotionalÏreactions€in€many€€jurors.€€Since€one€of€the€purposes€of€section€352€is€to€protect€a€party€fromÏemotional€bias€(òòPeople€v.€Branchóó€(2001)€91€Cal.App.4th€274,€286),€it€goes€without€saying€that€thereÐ À Ðare€many€cases€where€evidence€of€a€prior€sex€offense€is€quite€simply€too€evocative€to€be€admissible.ÌÌà  àAside€from€a€standard€section€352€claim,€it€should€not€be€forgotten€that€defense€counsel€hasÏa€duty€to€advocate€for€ð ðchanges€in€the€law€if€argument€can€be€made€supporting€change.ðð€€(òòPeopleÐ €Ð Ðv.€Feggansóó€(1967)€67€Cal.2d€444,€447.)€€In€a€proper€case,€the€creative€use€of€existing€case€law€mayÐ pÀ Ðprovide€for€a€basis€to€change€section€352€law€as€it€relates€to€propensity€evidence.ÌÌà  àIn€òòPeople€v.€Wilsonóó€(1992)€3€Cal.4th€926,€the€Supreme€Court€reaffirmed€the€longstandingÐ @ Ðrule€that€evidence€of€a€defendantððs€poverty€is€per€se€inadmissible€under€section€352€in€a€theft€case.€Ï(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€938„939.)€€The€rationale€for€this€rule€is€that€ð ðreliance€on€poverty€alone€as€evidence€ofÐ  p Ðmotive€is€deemed€unfair€to€the€defendant,€and€the€probative€value€of€such€evidence€is€consideredÏoutweighed€by€the€risk€of€prejudice.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€939.)€This€rule€of€per€se€exclusion€couldÐ P Ðconceivably€be€extended€to€some€sex€cases.€€A€hypothetical€will€illustrate€the€point.ÌÔ_ÔÌà  àAssume€that€a€12€year€old€girl€told€the€police€in€1987€that€the€defendant€raped€her.€At€thatÏtime,€the€police€investigated€the€allegation€and€interviewed€a€woman€who€provided€an€alibi€for€theÏdefendant.€As€a€result,€no€charges€were€filed.€€However,€in€a€present€prosecution,€the€People€proposeÏto€call€the€now€27€year€old€woman€to€testify€about€the€1987€incident.€€In€the€meantime,€theÏdefendantððs€alibi€witness€cannot€be€found.ÌÌà  àOn€these€facts,€it€can€be€argued€that€the€evidence€should€be€per€se€inadmissible€under€sectionÏ352.€€In€1987,€the€government€had€a€full€and€fair€opportunity€to€prosecute€the€defendant.€€However,Ïit€failed€to€do€so.€€Given€the€governmentððs€inaction,€it€is€quite€simply€too€late€for€this€highlyÏprejudicial€evidence€to€be€used.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Ellisóó€(1987)€195€Cal.App.3d€334,€345„346;€fn.€4;Ð @)$' Ðdefendant€is€estopped€to€complain€about€an€illegal€plea€bargain€since€ð ðthe€passage€of€time€will€.€.€.Ïmake€it€more€difficult€for€the€People€to€carry€their€burden€of€proving€the€criminal€conduct€at€issue.ðð)ÌÐ ,`'* Ðà  àAs€the€hypothetical€reveals,€there€may€be€situations€where€it€is€simply€unfair€to€allowÏadmission€of€propensity€evidence€involving€sex€crimes.€€Thus,€defense€counsel€should€not€beÏhesitant€to€seek€expansion€of€those€types€of€evidence€which€are€per€se€inadmissible€under€sectionÏ352.€€(òòPeople€v.€Wilson,€supraóó,€3€Cal.4th€926,€938„939.)Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àò òA.à8 ` àIf€the€Prosecution€Is€Allowed€to€Produce€Propensity€EvidenceÐ ` ° Ðunder€Section€1108,€the€Defense€May€Rebut€the€Evidence€byÏIntroducing€Character€Evidence€That€the€Defendant€Has€NotÏCommitted€Sexual€Assaults€under€Similar€Circumstances.ó óÐ0 €` x` x ÐÌà  àOftentimes,€a€sexual€assault€trial€will€be€a€credibility€contest€between€the€complainant€andÏthe€defendant.€€In€order€to€enhance€the€credibility€of€the€complainant,€the€prosecution€will€adduceÏsection€1108€evidence€if€it€is€available.€€If€section€1108€testimony€is€heard€by€the€jury,€the€defenseÏis€allowed€to€rebut€the€evidence€by€producing€evidence€that€the€defendant€has€not€committed€sexualÏassaults€even€though€he€had€an€opportunity€to€do€so.ÌÌà  àòòPeople€v.€Callahanóó€(1999)€74€Cal.App.4th€356€establishes€this€conclusion.€€In€òòCallahanóó,€theÐ ° Ðdefendant€was€charged€with€child€molestation.€€Pursuant€to€Evidence€Code€section€1108,€theÏprosecutor€adduced€evidence€that€the€defendant€had€committed€other€acts€of€child€molestation.€€InÏorder€to€counter€this€evidence,€defendant€sought€admission€of€the€testimony€of€other€children€toÏshow€that€he€had€not€molested€them€even€though€he€had€the€opportunity€to€do€so.€The€Court€ofÏAppeal€held€that€the€proffered€evidence€was€admissible.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€374„379.)Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€most€cases,€this€type€of€evidence€can€be€found€by€a€thorough€defense€attorney.€€After€all,Ïeven€the€most€sociopathic€individuals€do€not€commit€crimes€on€a€daily€basis.€Thus,€a€solidÏinvestigation€should€usually€turn€up€some€defense€witnesses€who€can€testify€that€the€defendant€didÏnot€sexually€assault€them€when€they€were€alone.ÌÌò òII.à8  àTHE€DEFENDANT€IS€ENTITLED€TO€ATTACK€THE€CREDIBILITY€OFÐ ð@ ÐTHE€COMPLAINANT€WITH€ALL€RELEVANT€IMPEACHING€EVIDENCE.ó óÐà0Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€primary€issue€in€most€criminal€trials€is€whether€the€alleged€victim€is€a€credible€witness.€ÏThis€is€particularly€true€in€sexual€assault€cases€where€the€credibility€of€the€complainant€is€often€theÏonly€issue.€Given€this€reality,€the€cases€are€legion€where€defense€counsel€have€sought€to€destroy€aÏcomplainantððs€credibility€by€showing€that€she€told€false€stories€about€unrelated€incidents.€€(òòFranklinÐ $à" Ðv.€Henryóó€(9th€Cir.€1997)€122€F.3d€1270,€1273;€òòPeople€v.€Adamsóó€(1988)€198€Cal.App.3d€10,€18;Ð €%Ð # ÐòòPeople€v€Wallóó€(1979)€95€Cal.App.3d€978,€983„989.)Ð p&À!$ ÐÌà  àThis€type€of€impeaching€evidence€is€critical€to€the€defense€since€ð ð[t]he€fact€that€a€witnessÏstated€something€that€is€not€true€as€true€is€relevant€on€the€witnessððs€credibility€whether€she€fabricatedÏthe€incident€or€fantasized€it.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€Franklinóó€(1994)€25€Cal.App.4th€328,€335,€overruled€onÐ 0*€%( Ðanother€point€in€òòFranklin€v.€Henry,€supraóó,€122€F.3d€1270.)€Given€the€importance€of€such€evidence,Ð  +p&) Ðit€is€manifest€that€defense€counsel€has€a€duty€to€conduct€a€diligent€investigation€in€search€ofÐ ,`'* Ðwitnesses€who€will€testify€to€the€complainantððs€lack€of€credibility.€€(òòPeople€v.€Popeóó€(1979)€23€Cal.3dÐ ° Ð412,€425;€defense€counsel€has€a€duty€to€investigate€all€defenses€of€fact.)ÌÌà  àIt€is€important€to€note€that€Proposition€8€has€greatly€broadened€the€parameters€of€admissibleÏimpeachment€evidence.€€As€the€Supreme€Court€has€held,€Proposition€8€effected€a€repeal€of€almostÏall€of€the€Evidence€Code€sections€which€formerly€governed€the€admissibility€of€impeachmentÏevidence.€€(òòPeople€v.€Harrisóó€(1989)€47€Cal.3d€1047,€1080„1082.)€€€Thus,€so€long€as€impeachingÐ P   Ðevidence€is€relevant€and€reliable,€it€must€be€admitted€subject€to€any€limitation€found€in€section€352.€Ï(òòIbidóó.)Ð 0 € ÐÌà  àIn€a€sexual€assault€case,€there€is€often€only€the€testimony€of€the€complainant€and€theÏdefendant.€Since€the€complainantððs€credibility€is€the€key€to€the€case,€a€skillful€defense€lawyer€willÏmarshal€all€of€the€impeaching€evidence€which€can€possibly€be€obtained.€€The€more€the€better.€€(SeeÐ ð@  ÐòòPeople€v.€Randleóó€(1982)€130€Cal.App.3d€286,€292„294;€defendant€was€entitled€to€impeach€theÐ à0  Ðcomplainant€with€evidence€of€her€reputation€for€drunkenness,€dishonesty€and€for€being€a€thief.)ÌÌà  àThe€best€form€of€impeachment€is€evidence€that€the€complainant€has€previously€told€a€falseÏstory€about€being€sexually€assaulted.€€This€type€of€evidence€goes€to€the€heart€of€the€case€and€itsÏexclusion€is€bound€to€be€prejudicial€error.€€(òòFranklin€v.€Henry,€supraóó,€122€F.3d€1270,€1273;€òòPeopleÐ à Ðv.€Adams,€supraóó,€198€Cal.App.3d€10,€19.)Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àòòPeople€v.€Wall,€supraóó,€95€Cal.App.3d€978€is€the€paradigmatic€case€in€this€genre.€€There,€theÐ `° Ðdefendant€was€charged€with€raping€an€18€year€old€woman.€€The€defense€was€that€a€sex€act€had€notÏoccurred.€€In€order€to€impeach€the€complainant,€the€defense€sought€to€call€her€former€boyfriend€whoÏwould€have€testified€that€she€had€threatened€to€make€a€false€claim€of€rape€against€him.€€In€reversingÏthe€trial€courtððs€exclusion€of€the€witness,€the€Court€of€Appeal€held€that€the€evidence€was€admissibleÏsince€it€tended€ð ðto€disprove€the€truthfulnessðð€of€the€complainantððs€testimony.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€989;€accord,Ð ` ÐòòPeople€v.€Adams,€supraóó,€198€Cal.App.3d€10,€16„19;€judgment€reversed€where€the€trial€court€refusedÐ P Ðto€admit€evidence€of€prior€false€claims€of€rape.)ÌÌà  àNotwithstanding€the€general€rule€that€impeachment€evidence€is€admissible,€Proposition€8€leftÏEvidence€Code€section€782€in€place.€€In€relevant€part,€section€782€provides€that€ð ðevidence€of€sexualÏconduct€of€the€complaining€witnessðð€is€admissible€to€attack€credibility€when€the€defendant€files€aÏwritten€motion€supported€by€an€affidavit€which€€makes€an€offer€of€proof€regarding€the€relevance€ofÏthe€evidence.€€Three€primary€points€must€be€made€regarding€section€782.ÌÌà  àFirst,€section€782€applies€only€in€those€instances€where€the€defendant€seeks€to€introduceÏð ðevidence€of€sexual€conduct.ðð€€(Section€782,€subd.€(a).)€€Thus,€there€is€no€need€to€comply€withÏsection€782€when€the€defense€seeks€to€admit€evidence€of€false€statements€made€by€the€complainant.€Ï(òòPeople€v.€Franklin,€supraóó,€25€Cal.App.4th€328,€334„335;€but€see€òòPeople€v.€Casasóó€(1986)€181Ð @)$' ÐCal.App.3d€889,€895;€solicitation€of€an€act€of€prostitution€falls€within€section€782€since€theÏð ðwillingness€to€engage€in€sexual€intercourseðð€is€encompassed€in€the€statute.)ÌÐ ,`'* Ðà  àSecond,€section€782€only€allows€for€the€admission€of€credibility€evidence.€€Under€EvidenceÏCode€section€1103,€subd.€(c)€(colloquially€known€as€the€rape€shield€law),€evidence€of€€aÏcomplainantððs€prior€sexual€relations€is€strictly€inadmissible€for€the€truth€of€the€matter€(i.e.€that€theÏcomplainant€consented€to€sex€with€the€defendant€or€anyone€else).€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Chandleróó€(1997)Ð €Ð Ð56€Cal.App.4th€703,€707„708.)ÌÌà  àThird,€section€782€is€not€a€rule€of€exclusion.€€So€long€as€the€proffered€evidence€is€trulyÏrelevant€to€an€issue€in€the€case,€the€court€must€allow€its€admission€if€there€is€compliance€with€theÏstatutory€procedure.ÌÌà  àòòPeople€v.€Randle,€supraóó,€130€Cal.App.3d€286€illustrates€this€principle.€€In€òòRandleóó,€theÐ `  Ðcomplainant€alleged€that€the€defendant€had€forced€her€to€orally€copulate€him€in€a€bathroom€at€theÏEmbarcadero€Center.€€The€defendant€testified€that€the€act€was€consensually€performed€for€money.€ÏOn€a€motion€for€new€trial,€the€defense€presented€numerous€declarations€establishing€that€theÏcomplainant€had€previously€performed€sex€acts€for€compensation.€€In€holding€that€a€new€trial€wasÏin€order,€the€Court€of€Appeal€observed€that€ð ðthe€evidence€of€her€lack€of€chastity€and€of€solicitingÏdrinks€or€money€for€sexual€acts€goes€to€the€issue€of€credibility.ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€294.)€€Thus,€the€evidenceÐ ° Ðwould€be€admissible€at€a€new€trial€since€section€782€merely€provides€ð ðthe€procedure€to€be€used€forÏthe€offer€of€proof€to€attackðð€the€complainantððs€credibility.€€(òòIbidóó.)Ð à ÐÌà  àAs€the€foregoing€cases€reveal,€impeachment€of€the€complainant€is€a€critical€factor€in€anyÏsexual€assault€trial.€€If€the€trial€court€improperly€excludes€credibility€evidence,€an€excellent€issue€willÏbe€available€for€appeal.ÌÌò òIII.à8  àAPPELLATE€COUNSEL€SHOULD€BE€ESPECIALLY€ALERT€TO€THEÐ 0€ ÐIMPROPER€ADMISSION€OF€OPINION€TESTIMONY€BY€A€SART€NURSE.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×ó óÐ pÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€the€1980ððs,€California€counties€developed€Sexual€Assault€Response€Teams€(SART).€TheseÏteams€provide€services€in€the€form€of€examination€and€treatment€of€reported€victims€of€sexualÏassault.€Typically,€a€professionally€trained€nurse€will€perform€an€examination€of€a€person€who€hasÏindicated€that€he€or€she€has€been€the€victim€of€a€sexual€assault.ÌÌà  àA€SART€nurse€is€often€called€to€testify€to€his€observations€of€the€complainantððs€physicalÏcondition.€Such€testimony€might€consist€of€observations€that€the€victim€was€bruised€or€that€thereÏwere€tears€or€cuts€to€a€sexual€organ.€€Without€doubt,€this€type€of€testimony€is€entirely€appropriate.€ÏHowever,€the€problem€is€that€SART€nurses€often€give€testimony€which€is€far€beyond€their€expertiseÏand€which€is€patently€inadmissible.ÌÌà  àThe€problem€is€further€exacerbated€since€many€defense€lawyers€appear€to€be€completelyÐ P( #& Ðunequipped€to€render€proper€objections.€€In€recent€years,€there€have€been€countless€jury€trials€whereÏdefense€counsel€sat€mute€as€SART€nurses€offered€improper€opinions.€Given€this€poor€performanceÏby€many€trial€lawyers,€it€is€incumbent€upon€appellate€counsel€to€closely€scrutinize€SART€testimony.€ÏIn€so€doing,€viable€claims€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€will€be€uncovered.ÌÌà  àA€frequent€opinion€offered€by€SART€nurses€is€that€the€complainantððs€injuries€are€ð ðconsistentððÏwith€the€allegation€of€sexual€assault.€This€opinion€testimony€is€flatly€inadmissible.ÌÌà  àUnder€California€law,€ð ðthe€qualifications€of€an€expert€must€be€related€to€the€particular€subjectÏupon€which€he€is€giving€expert€testimony.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€Hoganóó€(1982)€31€Cal.3d€815,€852,€overruledÐ  p  Ðon€other€grounds€in€òòPeople€v.€Cooperóó€(1991)€53€Cal.3d€771,€836.)€€Thus,€while€a€criminalist€mightÐ `  Ðbe€qualified€to€testify€concerning€whether€a€certain€fluid€is€blood,€he€is€not€qualified€to€testify€as€aÏð ðspatterðð€expert€absent€a€showing€of€his€special€knowledge€and€training€on€that€subject.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.Ð ð@  Ð852„853.)ÌÌà  àIn€the€case€of€a€SART€nurse,€the€witness€usually€has€absolutely€no€training€regarding€theÏgenesis€of€physical€injury€to€a€sexual€organ.€€While€the€nurse€is€certainly€qualified€to€testify€aboutÏthe€appearance€of€an€injury,€he€ordinarily€has€no€special€knowledge€regarding€whether€a€cut€mightÏbe€inflicted€by€consensual€sex€rather€than€rape.€Thus,€unless€the€prosecutor€has€laid€a€foundationÏconcerning€the€SART€nurseððs€training€or€knowledge€of€expert€studies€on€the€genesis€of€injuries,€heÏmay€not€offer€an€opinion€that€a€particular€injury€is€ð ðconsistentðð€with€sexual€assault.ÌÌà  àOn€this€last€point,€it€must€be€emphasized€that€there€are€few€scientific€studies€which€purportÏto€correlate€certain€physical€injuries€with€the€conclusion€that€they€were€inflicted€by€sexual€assault.€ÏAbsent€such€studies,€no€witness€should€be€allowed€to€testify€that€an€injury€is€ð ðconsistentðð€with€sexualÏassault.€€(òòDaubert€v.€Merrell€Dow€Pharmaceuticals,€Inc.óó€(1993)€509€U.S.€579,€590;€ð ðin€order€toÐ  p Ðqualify€as€ððscientific€knowledge,ðð€an€inference€or€assertion€must€be€derived€by€the€scientificÏmethod;ðð€òòPacific€Gas€&€Electric€Co.€v.€Zuckermanóó€(1987)€189€Cal.App.3d€1113,€1135;€ð ð[w]hereÐ P Ðan€expert€bases€his€conclusion€upon€assumptions€which€are€not€supported€by€the€record,€uponÏmatters€which€are€not€reasonably€relied€upon€by€other€experts,€or€upon€factors€which€are€speculative,Ïremote€or€conjectural,€then€his€conclusion€has€no€evidentiary€value.€€[Citations.]ðð)ÌÌà  àAside€from€a€lack€of€foundation€objection,€a€SART€nurseððs€opinion€testimony€is€inadmissibleÏfor€a€more€fundamental€reason.€€As€a€general€proposition,€a€witness€is€barred€from€offering€anÏopinion€regarding€the€defendantððs€guilt€or€innocence.€€(òòPeople€v.€Torresóó€(1995)€33€Cal.App.4th€37,Ð $à" Ð46„47.)€€Thus,€even€an€expert€is€precluded€from€testifying€that€a€witness€has€been€truthful.€€(òòPeopleÐ €%Ð # Ðv.€Johnsonóó€(1993)€19€Cal.App.4th€778,€786„791;€òòPeople€v.€Sergillóó€(1982)€138€Cal.App.3d€34,€39„40.)Ð p&À!$ ÐÌà  àWhen€a€SART€nurse€testifies€that€the€complainantððs€version€of€events€is€ð ðconsistentðð€withÏsexual€assault,€the€testimony€is€a€thinly€veiled€opinion€that€the€complainant€is€a€credible€witness.€ÏIndeed,€the€entire€SART€exam€proceeds€on€the€assumption€that€the€complainant€is€telling€the€truth.€ÏViewed€from€this€perspective,€the€SART€nurse€should€not€be€allowed€to€testify€to€an€opinion€whichÏimplicitly€advises€the€jury€that€the€complainant€is€credible.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Roscoeóó€(1985)€168Ð ,`'* ÐCal.App.3d€1093,€1099„1100;€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€expert€testimony€that€the€complainant€wasÏa€victim€of€child€molestation.)ÌÌà  àIn€short,€it€is€trial€counselððs€duty€to€ensure€that€the€testimony€of€a€SART€nurse€is€confinedÏto€a€proper€purpose.€€If€proper€objections€were€not€made€below,€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€should€be€advanced.ÌÌò òIV.à8  àPROPERLY€APPLIED,€THE€FRESH€COMPLAINT€RULE€ALLOWS€FORÐ @  ÐTHE€ADMISSION€OF€A€VERY€LIMITED€CLASS€OF€EVIDENCE.ó óÐ0 €Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àUnder€California€law,€the€prosecution€is€entitled€to€introduce€ð ðevidence€that€the€allegedÏvictim€of€a€sexual€offense€disclosed€or€reported€the€incident€to€another€person€shortly€after€itsÏoccurrence.€.€.€.ðð€(òòPeople€v.€Brownóó€(1994)€8€Cal.4th€746,€748.)€€The€alleged€victimððs€extrajudicialÐ ð@  Ðstatement€ð ðis€admissible€for€a€limited,€nonhearsay€purpose€„€namely,€simply€to€establish€that€suchÏa€complaint€was€made€„€in€order€to€forestall€the€trier€of€fact€from€inferring€erroneously€that€noÏcomplaint€was€made,€and€from€further€concluding,€as€a€result€of€that€mistaken€inference,€that€theÏvictim€in€fact€had€not€been€sexually€assaulted.€€[Citation.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€748„749.)Ð ° ÐÌà  àIn€determining€whether€to€admit€a€ð ðfresh€complaintðð€made€by€the€alleged€victim,€the€trialÏcourt€must€apply€the€ð ðordinary€standard€of€relevance.€€[Citation.]ðð€€(òòBrown,€supraóó,€8€Cal.4th€at€p.Ð €Ð Ð763.)€€In€so€doing,€the€court€should€consider€whether€the€ð ðcomplaint€was€made€immediatelyÏfollowing€the€alleged€assault€or€was€preceded€by€some€delayðð€and€ð ðwhether€the€complaint€wasÏvolunteered€spontaneously€by€the€victim€or€instead€was€prompted€by€some€inquiry€or€questioningÏfrom€another€person.ðð€€(òòIbidóó.)€€However,€neither€of€these€factors€is€dispositive.€€(òòIbidóó.)Ð @ ÐÌà  àIt€is€essential€to€note€that€ð ðonly€the€fact€that€a€complaint€was€made,€and€the€circumstancesÏsurrounding€its€makingðð€are€admissible.€€(òòBrown,€supraóó,€8€Cal.4th€at€p.€760.)€Since€the€evidence€isÐ ` Ðnot€admissible€for€the€truth€of€the€matter€asserted,€ð ðthe€details€of€the€victimððs€extrajudicialÏcomplaintðð€may€not€be€introduced.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€763.)€€Upon€request,€it€is€the€courtððs€duty€to€ð ðinstructÐ ð@ Ðthe€jury€to€consider€such€evidence€only€for€the€purpose€of€establishing€that€a€complaint€was€made,Ïso€as€to€dispel€any€erroneous€inference€that€the€victim€was€silent,€but€not€as€proof€of€the€truth€of€theÏcontent€of€the€victimððs€statement.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€757.)Ð À! ÐÌà  àThe€lesson€to€be€learned€about€the€fresh€complaint€rule€is€that€it€is€of€very€limited€application.€ÏIt€is€only€the€mere€fact€that€a€complaint€was€made€that€is€admissible.€€Thus,€a€vigilant€trial€attorneyÏwill€carefully€object€when€the€prosecutor€seeks€to€elicit€an€extrajudicial€statement€which€describesÏthe€ð ðdetailsðð€of€the€alleged€offense.€€If€there€has€been€a€proper€objection€below,€a€strong€issue€isÏpresented€for€appeal.€€The€Supreme€Court€has€so€indicated:€€ð ð[I]f€the€details€of€the€victimððsÏextrajudicial€complaint€are€admitted€into€evidence,€even€with€a€proper€limiting€instruction,€a€juryÏmay€well€find€it€difficult€not€to€view€these€details€as€tending€to€prove€the€truth€of€the€underlyingÏcharge€of€sexual€assault€.€.€.€.ðð€€(òòBrown,€supraóó,€8€Cal.4th€746,€763.)Ð 0*€%( ÐÌà  àOf€course,€it€is€often€the€case€that€trial€counsel€will€have€failed€to€make€a€proper€objection.€Ð ,`'* ÐIn€this€circumstance,€it€will€be€necessary€to€advance€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.ÌÌò òV.à8  àALTHOUGH€THE€PROSECUTION€CAN€PRESENT€EXPERT€TESTIMONYÐ à ÐTO€DISABUSE€THE€JURORS€OF€MYTHS€WHICH€THEY€MAY€BELIEVE,ÏSUCH€TESTIMONY€MAY€NOT€BE€USED€AS€SUBSTANTIVE€EVIDENCEÏOF€GUILT.ó óÐ` °Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€1984,€the€California€Supreme€Court€discussed€the€then€fairly€recent€concept€of€rape€traumaÏsyndrome.€€(òòPeople€v.€€Bledsoeóó€(1984)€36€Cal.3d€236,€247.)€€Generally€speaking,€the€syndromeÐ 0 € Ðserves€to€explain€the€physical,€psychological€and€emotional€reactions€which€are€common€to€rapeÏvictims.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€241„242,€fn.€4.)€€Expert€testimony€concerning€the€syndrome€is€not€admissibleÐ `  Ðto€prove€that€the€alleged€victim€was€raped.€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€251.)€€However,€the€expert€may€testify€toÐ P  Ðdisabuse€ð ðthe€jury€of€some€widely€held€misconceptions€about€rape€and€rape€victims,€so€that€it€mayÏevaluate€the€evidence€free€of€the€constraints€of€popular€myths.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€247„248.)€Ð à0  ÐOne€such€myth€is€that€rape€victims€do€not€delay€in€reporting€the€crime.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€247.)Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àFollowing€òòBledsoeóó,€the€Supreme€Court€has€also€held€that€an€expert€witness€may€testify€aboutÐ ° Ðthe€child€sexual€abuse€accommodation€syndrome€(CSAAS).€€(òòPeople€v.€McAlpinóó€(1991)€53€Cal.3dÐ  ð Ð1289,€1300„1301.)€As€is€the€case€with€rape€trauma€syndrome€evidence,€ð ðexpert€testimony€on€theÏcommon€reactions€of€child€molestation€victims€is€not€admissible€to€prove€that€the€complainingÏwitness€has€in€fact€been€sexually€abused;€it€is€admissible€to€rehabilitate€such€witnessððs€credibilityÏwhen€the€defendant€suggests€that€the€childððs€conduct€after€the€incident€„€e.g.,€a€delay€in€reporting€„Ïis€inconsistent€with€his€or€her€testimony€claiming€molestation.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòIbidóó,€fn.€omitted.)Ð P  ÐÌà  àConsistent€with€the€foregoing€principles,€the€Supreme€Court€has€indicated€that€an€expertÏwitness€may€also€testify€about€related€matters€in€a€sexual€assault€case.€€In€òòMcAlpinóó,€the€defendantÐ  p Ðwas€charged€with€molesting€his€girlfriendððs€eight€year€old€daughter.€€Although€the€girlfriendÏcorroborated€the€daughterððs€account,€she€did€not€contact€the€police.€€On€these€facts,€the€SupremeÏCourt€held€that€the€prosecutor€properly€called€an€expert€witness€to€testify€that:€€(1)€parents€sometimesÏdo€not€report€the€molestation€of€their€children;€and€(2)€there€is€no€ð ðprofileðð€of€a€typical€childÏmolester.€€(òòMcAlpin,€supraóó,€53€Cal.3d€at€pp.€1298„1304.)€€The€testimony€was€not€admitted€to€proveÐ Ð  Ðthat€a€molestation€had€occurred€but€only€to:€€(1)€rehabilitate€the€girlfriendððs€credibility;€and€(2)Ïdisabuse€the€jury€of€false€stereotypes€concerning€the€identity€of€child€molesters.€€(òòIbidóó.)Ð °"  ÐÌà  àAs€a€preliminary€observation€about€òòBledsoeóó€and€òòMcAlpinóó,€it€is€critical€to€note€that€they€restÐ $à" Ðon€the€assumption€that€jurors€òòactuallyóó€believe€certain€falsehoods€(i.e.€that€all€rape€victims€promptlyÐ €%Ð # Ðcall€the€police€and€that€all€child€molesters€are€gay€or€alcoholic€or€ragged€old€men).€€(òòMcAlpin,€supraóó,Ð p&À!$ Ð53€Cal.3d€at€pp.€1302„1303;€òòBledsoe,€supraóó,€36€Cal.3d€at€p.€247.)€€However,€there€is€a€seriousÐ `'°"% Ðquestion€as€to€whether€this€assumption€is€correct.€While€the€Supreme€Court€purported€to€rely€onÏð ðstudiesðð€which€supported€its€assumption,€one€would€think€that€the€voir€dire€of€jurors€would€be€a€farÏmore€objective€method€of€determining€if€jurors€hold€stereotypical€and€false€ideas.ÌÌà  àIndeed,€a€recent€Court€of€Appeal€decision€implicitly€suggests€that€the€òòBledsoeóó€and€òòMcAlpinóóÐ ,`'* Ðassumption€should€be€reexamined.€€In€òòPeople€v.€Robbieóó€(2001)€92€Cal.App.4th€1075,€the€prosecutorÐ ° Ðcalled€an€expert€witness€to€testify€about€the€characteristics€of€people€who€commit€rapes.€€InÏattempting€to€support€the€judgment,€the€Attorney€General€contended€that€the€evidence€wasÏadmissible€to€ð ðdisabuse€the€jury€of€misconceptions€about€rapists.ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€1085.)€€In€response,€theÐ €Ð ÐCourt€of€Appeal€noted:ÌÌà8  àà ` àð ðDefense€counsel€did€not€challenge€the€existence€of€public€misconceptionsÏabout€sex€offenders,€requiring€the€admission€of€expert€testimony.€Evidence€CodeÏsection€801,€subdivision€(a)€requires€that€expert€testimony€be€ðð[r]elated€to€a€subjectÏthat€is€sufficiently€beyond€common€experience€that€the€opinion€of€an€expert€wouldÏassist€the€trier€of€fact.ðð€€òòThe€presupposition€that€the€public€shares€the€mistaken€viewÐ `  Ðarticulated€by€the€Attorney€General€is€certainly€debatableóó.€€Because€no€objection€onÐ P  Ðthis€ground€was€made,€however,€the€issue€was€never€joined€at€the€trial€level.ðð€€(òòIdóó.,Ð ð@  Ðat€p.€1086,€fn.€1,€emphasis€added.)Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIt€has€been€almost€twenty€years€since€the€ð ðsyndromeðð€experts€have€been€allowed€to€testify.ÏGiven€the€intervening€proliferation€of€media€discussion€about€sexual€assault,€one€would€think€thatÏthe€strength€of€false€stereotypes€would€have€receded.€Thus,€it€may€be€time€to€challenge€the€validityÏof€the€òòBledsoeó󀄀òòMcAlpinóó€assumption.Ð à ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€it€is€worth€noting€that€three€states€have€precluded€the€use€of€child€sexual€abuseÏaccommodation€syndrome€evidence.€(òòNewkirk€v.€Commonwealthóó€(1996)€___€Ky.€___€[937€S.W.2dÐ `° Ð690];€òòState€v.€Bolinóó€(1996)€___€Tenn.€___€[922€S.W.2d€870];€òòCommonwealth€v.€Dunkleóó€(1992)€529Ð P  ÐPa.€168€[602€A.2d€830];€see€also€òòFranklin€v.€Henry,€supraóó,€122€F.3d€1270,€1273;€favorably€citingÐ @ ÐòòDunkleóó.)Ô_Ô׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€Thus,€California€should€be€encouraged€to€join€these€progressive€jurisdictions.Ð 0€ ÐÌà  àAssuming€that€California€does€not€abrogate€the€present€rule,€appellate€counsel€must€carefullyÏreview€the€record€to€ensure€that€expert€testimony€was€carefully€limited€to€its€proper€purpose.€€If€theÏprosecutor€used€the€evidence€as€substantive€evidence€of€guilt€and€there€was€no€objection€below,€aÏclaim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€should€be€brought.ÌÌà  àSimilarly,€trial€counsel€has€a€duty€to€request€the€standard€limiting€instruction€concerning€theÏuse€of€expert€testimony€regarding€the€various€ð ðsyndromesðð€(CALJIC€No.€10.64).€€If€there€was€noÏrequest€for€the€instruction,€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€may€lie.€€(òòUnited€States€v.Ð  #ð! ÐMyersóó€(7th€Cir.€1990)€892€F.2d€642,€648„649;€counsel€erred€by€failing€to€request€a€limitingÐ $à" Ðinstruction€on€the€use€of€a€co„defendantððs€statement;€see€also€òòPeople€v.€Housleyóó€(1992)€6Ð €%Ð # ÐCal.App.4th€947,€958„959;€trial€court€must€give€No.€10.64€òòsuaóó€òòsponteóó.)Ð p&À!$ ÐÌà  àFinally,€appellate€counsel€must€be€alert€to€any€attempt€by€the€government€to€expand€the€useÐ P( #& Ðof€expert€testimony.€€Recently,€the€First€District€put€a€halt€to€one€attempted€expansion.ÌÌà  àIn€òòPeople€v.€Robbie,€supraóó,€92€Cal.App.4th€1075,€the€prosecutor€called€a€Department€ofÐ à ÐJustice€special€agent,€Sharon€Pagaling,€to€testify€regarding€the€characteristics€of€rapists.€€TheÏevidence€was€proffered€for€the€purpose€of€showing€that€the€defendantððs€behavior€was€consistent€withÏthat€of€a€rapist.€€In€reversing€the€judgment,€the€Court€of€Appeal€found€that€the€expertððs€testimonyÏconstituted€improper€ð ðprofileðð€evidence€(i.e.€that€the€defendant€was€guilty€since€his€conduct€matchedÏthat€of€the€typical€rapist).€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€1083„1087.)€€In€reaching€this€conclusion,€the€court€carefullyÐ @  Ðdistinguished€òòMcAlpinóó:€€Ð 0 € ÐÌà8  àð ðPagaling€properly€could€have€testified€that€rapists€behave€in€a€variety€of€ways€andÏthat€there€is€no€ððtypical€rapist.ðð€€Had€she€done€so€her€testimony€would€have€beenÏsimilar€to€that€permitted€in€òòMcAlpinóó.€€The€problem€here€is€that€Pagaling€did€notÐ ð@  Ðmerely€attack€the€stereotype€by€explaining€that€there€is€€no€ððtypical€sex€offender.ðð€ÏInstead,€she€replaced€the€brutal€rapist€archetype€with€another€image:€€an€offenderÏwhose€behavioral€pattern€exactly€€matched€defendantððs.ðð€€(òòRobbie,€supraóó,€92Ð À ÐCal.App.4th€at€p.€1087.)Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAs€òòRobbieóó€demonstrates,€expert€testimony€must€be€closely€scrutinized.€€Unless€the€evidenceÐ à Ðwas€carefully€limited€to€the€parameters€specified€in€òòBledsoeóó€and€òòMcAlpinóó,€a€meritorious€issue€isÐ €Ð Ðavailable€for€appeal.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€McFarlandóó€(2001)€78€Cal.App.4th€489,€493„497;€judgmentÐ pÀ Ðreversed€where€a€government€psychiatrist€testified€to€his€opinion€that€the€defendantððs€act€of€touchingÏa€child€was€motivated€by€a€sexual€intent.)ÌÌà  àFinally,€there€may€be€some€sex€cases€where€the€prosecution€seeks€to€introduce€expertÏtestimony€that€the€complainant€suffers€from€battered€womenððs€syndrome€(Ô_ÔBWSÔ_Ô).€€Insofar€as€theÏLegislature€has€specifically€authorized€the€use€of€this€type€of€evidence€(Evidence€Code€sectionÏ1107),€there€is€little€that€the€defense€can€do€to€challenge€its€admissibility€assuming€that€a€foundationÏis€laid€that€the€complainant€is€in€fact€a€battered€woman.€€(òòPeople€v.€Gomezóó€(1999)€72€Cal.App.4thÐ ð@ Ð405,€415„418;€Ô_ÔBWSÔ_Ô€evidence€was€improperly€allowed€where€there€was€no€evidence€that€the€victimÏhad€previously€been€assaulted;€but€see€òòPeople€v.€Williamsóó€(2000)€78€Cal.App.4th€1118,€1126„1130;Ð Ð  ÐÔ_ÔBWSÔ_Ô€evidence€is€admissible€even€if€there€has€been€no€prior€assault;€òòPeople€v.€Ô_ÔGadlinÔ_Ôóó€(2000)€78Ð À! ÐCal.App.4th€587,€593„594;€one€prior€assault€was€sufficient€to€allow€admission€of€Ô_ÔBWSÔ_Ô€evidence.)€ÏLike€the€other€syndromes,€Ô_ÔBWSÔ_Ô€evidence€may€not€be€adduced€as€substantive€evidence€of€theÏdefendantððs€guilt.€€(Evidence€Code€section€1107,€subd.€(a).)€€However,€the€evidence€may€be€admittedÏto€shore€up€the€credibility€of€the€complainant.€€(òòPeople€v.€Ô_ÔGadlinÔ_Ôóó,€òòsupraóó,€78€Cal.App.4th€587,€594.)€Ð €%Ð # ÐIn€such€a€case,€a€proper€limiting€instruction€should€be€given.€€(òòPeople€v.€Moranóó€(1997)€58Ð p&À!$ ÐCal.App.4th€1210,€1216„1217.)ÌÌò òVI.à8  àTHE€DEFENSE€IS€PERMITTED€TO€PRESENT€EXPERT€AND€LAYÐ @)$' ÐOPINION€TESTIMONY€THAT€THE€DEFENDANT€DOES€NOT€HAVE€THEÏCHARACTER€OF€A€SEXUAL€ASSAILANT.ó óÐ +p&)Ð Ð  ÐÐ ,`'* Ðà  àIn€a€sex€case,€the€nature€of€the€charge€provides€the€prosecution€with€a€head€start€in€obtainingÏa€conviction.€€In€order€to€counter€this€reality,€it€is€incumbent€upon€the€defense€to€marshal€as€muchÏhelpful€evidence€as€is€possible.€To€this€end,€the€California€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€defenseÏis€allowed€to€introduce€expert€and€lay€opinion€evidence€that€the€defendant€is€not€a€sexual€assailant.ÌÌà  àIn€òòPeople€v.€Stollóó€(1989)€49€Cal.3d€1136,€the€defendant€was€charged€with€child€molestation.€Ð ` ° ÐHe€sought€to€call€a€psychologist€who€had€performed€tests€on€him.€€Based€on€the€tests€and€hisÏinterviews€with€the€defendant,€the€psychologist€was€prepared€to€testify€that€the€defendant€did€notÏbear€the€characteristics€of€a€child€molester.€€The€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€psychologistððs€expertÏopinion€was€admissible€character€evidence€which€the€jury€could€consider.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€1152„1154.)Ð  p  ÐÌà  àSeveral€years€later,€the€Supreme€Court€reached€the€same€result€with€respect€to€lay€opinions.€ÏIn€òòPeople€v.€McAlpin,€supraóó,€53€Cal.3d€1289,€the€defense€sought€to€call€the€defendantððs€friends€whoÐ ð@  Ðwere€prepared€to€testify€that€he€was€€not€someone€who€would€molest€children.€The€Supreme€CourtÏheld€that€such€testimony€is€admissible€so€long€as€it€is€based€on€the€witnessðð€ð ðpersonal€observationÏof€defendantððs€ððconduct€with€childrenðð;€.€.€.€.ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€1308„1309.)€€€€While€Evidence€CodeÐ À Ðsection€1102€precludes€the€witness€from€testifying€to€specific€instances€of€the€defendantððs€behavior,Ïthe€witnessðð€opinion€is€admissible.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€1309„1310.)׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  ð ÐÌà  àA€second€aspect€of€òòMcAlpinóó€is€of€great€help€to€the€defense.€€In€excluding€the€testimony€ofÐ €Ð Ðthe€defense€witnesses,€the€trial€court€relied€on€Evidence€Code€section€352.€€The€Supreme€CourtÏfound€that€this€ruling€constituted€an€abuse€of€discretion€since:€€(1)€the€evidence€could€have€beenÏquickly€presented;€and€(2)€it€went€to€the€central€issue€in€the€case.€€(òòMcAlpin,€supraóó,€53€Cal.3d€at€p.Ð P  Ð1310,€fn€15.)€€Thus,€òòMcAlpinóó€is€powerful€authority€for€the€proposition€that€the€trial€court€may€notÐ @ Ðarbitrarily€exclude€proffered€defense€evidence.ÌÌà  àIn€this€regard,€it€must€be€emphasized€that€section€352€allows€for€the€exclusion€of€evidenceÏonly€when€ð ðits€probative€value€is€substantially€outweighedðð€by€its€prejudicial€effect.€€Thus,€in€a€sexÏcase€where€the€defense€is€trying€to€€prove€a€negative€(i.e.€the€defendant€did€not€commit€the€act),€theÏtrial€court€should€not€use€section€352€to€exclude€defense€evidence.€€(òòKessler€v.€Grayóó€(1978)€77Ð à0 ÐCal.App.3d€284,€292;€ð ð[w]here€the€evidence€relates€to€a€critical€issue,€directly€supports€an€inferenceÏrelevant€to€that€issue,€and€other€evidence€does€not€as€directly€support€the€same€inference,€theÏtestimony€must€be€received€over€a€section€352€objection€absent€highly€unusual€circumstances.ðð)ÌÌò òVII.à8  àIN€A€CHILD€MOLEST€CASE,€THE€DEFENSE€IS€ALLOWED€TO€PRESENTÐ $à" ÐEVIDENCE€THAT€THE€COMPLAINANT€HAD€PREEXISTINGÏKNOWLEDGE€ABOUT€SEXUAL€MATTERS.ó óÐp&À!$Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€child€molestation€cases,€the€prosecutor€will€typically€argue€that€the€complainant€must€haveÐ P( #& Ðbeen€sexually€assaulted€since€he€or€she€was€able€to€describe€sex€acts€which€would€otherwise€beÏunknown€to€a€child.€€In€order€to€counter€this€argument,€defense€counsel€should€marshal€evidenceÏregarding€the€childððs€preexisting€knowledge€of€sexual€matters.€€This€evidence€can€take€several€forms.ÌÌà  àIn€some€cases,€the€complainant€will€have€been€previously€molested€by€someone€other€thanÏthe€defendant.€€If€so,€proof€of€the€prior€molestation€is€admissible€ð ðto€show€that€the€complainingÏwitness€had€been€subjected€to€similar€acts€by€others€in€order€to€cast€doubt€upon€the€conclusion€thatÏthe€child€must€have€learned€of€these€acts€through€the€defendant.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€Daggettóó€(1990)€225Ð @  ÐCal.App.3d€751,€757.)€€This€type€of€evidence€is€so€pivotal€that€its€exclusion€violates€a€defendantððsÏfederal€due€process€right€to€a€fair€trial.€€(òòLaJoie€v.€Thompsonóó€(9th€Cir.€2000)€217€F.3d€663,€668„674.)Ð  p  ÐÌà  àIn€a€particular€case,€the€prosecutor€might€note€that€the€complainant€has€used€sexual€termsÏwhich€are€usually€unknown€to€children.€€If€this€argument€is€mounted,€the€defense€is€permitted€toÏadduce€evidence€concerning€the€sexual€language€to€which€the€complainant€has€been€exposed.€Ï(òòPeople€v.€Burton€óó(1961)€55€Cal.2d€328,€345;€see€also€òòPeople€v.€Santosóó€(1990)€222€Cal.App.3d€723,Ð Ð  Ð739;€reversal€ordered€in€a€child€molest€case€where€the€ð ð[d]efendant€presented€testimony€that€M.€hadÏwatched€x„rated€movies,€thus€suggesting€that€she€had€the€knowledge€necessary€to€make€up€theÏstory.ðð)ÌÌà  àAside€from€direct€evidence€concerning€the€complainantððs€knowledge€of€sexual€matters,€theÏdefendant€may€also€seek€to€adduce€circumstantial€evidence€about€information€which€might€haveÏbeen€imparted€in€the€complainantððs€home.€€For€example,€it€is€proper€to€inquire€whether€a€parent€hasÏany€unusual€fears€regarding€sex.ÌÌà8  àð ðIf€the€mother€is€abnormally€oriented€toward€sexual€conduct,€and€has€an€abnormalÏfear€of€and€reaction€to€sexual€relations,€she€may,€quite€unconsciously,€build€up,€in€herÏown€mind,€a€quite€innocent€act€or€caress€into€a€grievous€wrong.€€Young€children€areÏespecially€suggestible.€The€inquiries€put€by€such€a€mother€to€her€daughter€may,Ïthemselves,€implant€into€the€childððs€mind€ideas€and€details€which€existed€only€in€theÏfears€and€fantasies€of€the€adult.€€Once€implanted,€they€become€quite€real€in€the€mindÏof€the€child€witness€and€are€impervious€to€cross„examination.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€SchollóóÐ Ð  Ð(1964)€225€Cal.App.2d€558,€563.)Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThere€are€a€large€variety€of€sources€from€which€a€child€might€obtain€information€about€sexualÏmatters.€€A€resourceful€defense€attorney€should€be€able€to€find€and€produce€such€evidence€in€anÏappropriate€case.ÌÌò òVIII.à8  àDEFENSE€COUNSEL€SHOULD€BE€EVER€VIGILANT€IN€PROTECTINGÐ `'°"% ÐTHE€CONFRONTATION€CLAUSE€AGAINST€THE€CONSTANT€EROSIONÏWHICH€IS€OCCURRING€IN€CHILD€MOLEST€CASES.ó óÐ@)$'Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àOver€the€last€twenty€years,€the€issue€of€child€molestation€has€become€a€highly€emotionalÏsubject€of€public€discussion.€€As€a€result,€politicians€and€prosecutors€have€rushed€forward€to€ð ðprotectÐ ,`'* Ðthe€childrenðð€by€enacting€several€reforms€in€the€law.€€While€these€reforms€may€have€beenÏpromulgated€with€the€best€of€intentions,€the€effect€has€been€to€severely€erode€the€ConfrontationÏClause.€€Although€the€reforms€have€been€approved€by€the€courts,€defense€counsel€should€nonethelessÏseek€enforcement€of€the€Confrontation€Clause€to€the€fullest€extent€possible.ÌÌà  àFor€present€purposes,€counsel€should€be€aware€of€three€possible€issues€which€might€arise€inÏa€particular€case:€€(1)€the€use€of€Evidence€Code€section€1360;€(2)€the€use€of€Penal€Code€sectionÏ868.5;€and€(3)€the€use€of€videotaped€testimony€of€a€child.€Each€of€these€issues€presents€a€substantialÏconcern€under€the€Confrontation€Clause.ÌÌà  àIn€1995,€the€Legislature€enacted€Evidence€Code€section€1360.€€In€material€part,€section€1360Ïallows€for€the€admission€of€a€hearsay€statement€made€by€a€child€under€the€age€of€12€when€theÏstatement€describes€an€act€of€child€abuse.€€If€the€child€is€declared€unavailable€as€a€witness,€theÏstatement€may€be€admitted€if:€€(1)€it€contains€ð ðsufficient€indicia€of€reliability;ðð€and€(2)€there€isÏcorroboration€of€the€statement.€€Although€section€1360€has€been€upheld€as€against€a€ConfrontationÏClause€challenge€(òòPeople€v.€Ô_ÔEcclestonÔ_Ôóó€(2001)€89€Cal.App.4th€436),€several€arguments€are€potentiallyÐ À Ðavailable€when€the€prosecution€uses€the€statute.ÌÌà  àSection€1360,€subd.€(b)€provides€that€the€prosecutor€must€disclose€his€intent€to€rely€on€aÏstatement€ð ðsufficiently€in€advance€of€the€proceedings€in€order€to€provide€the€adverse€party€with€a€fairÏopportunity€to€meet€the€statement.ðð€€As€construed€by€one€Court€of€Appeal,€the€provision€requiresÏdisclosure€prior€to€the€beginning€of€the€trial.€€(òòPeople€v.€Roberto€V.óó€(2001)€93€Cal.App.4th€1350,Ð `° Ð1369„1373.)€€Thus,€untimely€disclosure€may€lead€to€exclusion€of€the€statement.€€(òòIbidóó.)Ð P  ÐÌà  àUnder€California€law,€a€witness€is€ð ðunavailableðð€when€he€is€suffering€from€an€ð ðexistingÏphysical€or€mental€illness€or€infirmity.ðð€€(Evidence€Code€section€240,€subd.€(a)(3).)€€Oftentimes,€theÏprosecution€will€make€a€bold€claim€that€a€child€will€be€harmed€if€he€is€required€to€testify.€€However,Ïsuch€an€assertion€is€insufficient€to€establish€unavailability.€Rather,€the€prosecution€must€call€anÏexpert€witness€to€establish€that€the€witness€is€truly€at€risk€if€he€testifies.€€(òòPeople€v.€Stritzingeróó€(1983)Ð ð@ Ð34€Cal.3d€505,€514„518;€motherððs€testimony€concerning€her€daughterððs€mental€health€was€legallyÏinsufficient€to€establish€unavailability;€but€see€òòPeople€v.€Alcalaóó€(1992)€4€Cal.4th€742,€780;€witnessððÐ Ð  Ðown€testimony€may€demonstrate€unavailability.)ÌÌà  àImportantly,€the€prosecutor€is€not€entitled€to€rely€on€a€bold€assertion€that€a€young€child€isÏð ðunavailableðð€since€he€is€too€young€to€testify.€€Rather,€the€witnessðð€incompetence€must€beÏestablished€as€a€matter€of€fact.€€(òòPeople€v.€Roberto€V.,€supra,óó€93€Cal.App.4th€1350,€1368„1369;€trialÐ €%Ð # Ðcourt€erred€in€finding€that€a€four€year€old€child€was€incompetent€without€holding€a€hearing.)ÌÌà  àAssuming€that€the€child€is€truly€unavailable€as€a€witness,€the€prosecutor€must€still€establishÏthe€ð ðreliabilityðð€of€the€hearsay€statement.€€Under€U.S.€Supreme€Court€authority,€the€issue€ofÏreliability€€must€be€determined€by€a€consideration€of€several€factors:€€(1)€the€spontaneity€andÏconsistent€repetition€of€the€statement;€(2)€the€mental€state€of€the€declarant;€(3)€use€of€terminologyÏunexpected€from€a€child;€and€(4)€lack€of€motive€to€fabricate.€€(òòIdaho€v.€Wrightóó€(1990)€497€U.S.€805,Ð ,`'* Ð821„822;€òòPeople€v.€Ô_ÔEcclestonÔ_Ô,€supraóó,€89€Cal.App.4th€436,€445.)€€Obviously,€these€factors€must€beÐ ° Ðevaluated€on€a€case„by„case€basis.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Roberto€V.,€supraóó,€93€Cal.App.4th€at€pp.€1373„Ð  ð Ð1377;€reversible€error€found€due€to€admission€of€unreliable€statement.)€€ÌÌà  àAside€from€the€existing€rules€regarding€section€1360,€there€is€a€foundational€question€whichÏshould€not€be€ignored.€€Notwithstanding€the€legal€fiction€that€young€children€can€provide€credibleÏtestimony,€any€sane€adult€knows€better.€€Children€frequently€lie.€€They€do€so€because€there€are€noÏconsequences€from€telling€a€lie€and€because€they€do€not€appreciate€the€significance€of€the€act€ofÏlying.€Both€science€and€several€celebrated€cases€reveal€this€to€be€true.€€(See€òòNorth€Carolina€v.€KellyóóÐ 0 € Ð(1995)€118€N.C.App.€589€[456€S.E.2d€861];€judgment€reversed€in€infamous€ð ðLittle€Rascalsðð€caseÏwhere€29€children€claimed€to€have€been€sexually€molested€at€a€day€care€center€and€corroboration€wasÏnon„existent;€òòNew€Jersey€v.€Michaelsóó€(1993)€264€N.J.€Super.€579€[625€A.2d€489],€affirmed€136€N.J.Ð P  Ð299€[742€A.2d€1372];€judgment€reversed€where€19€children€testified€to€sexual€abuse€at€a€day€careÏcenter€and€corroboration€was€non„existent;€see€also€òòUnited€States€v.€Bigheadóó€(9th€Cir.€1997)€128Ð à0  ÐF.3d€1329,€1337„1338€(dis.€opn.€of€Noonan,€J.);€comparing€modern€child€molest€cases€to€theÏincredible€testimony€offered€at€the€Salem€witch€trials;€Ceci€and€Friedman,€òòThe€Suggestibility€ofÐ À ÐChildren:€€Scientific€Research€and€Legal€Implicationsóó€(2000)€86€Cornell€L.Rev.€33,€84,€fn.€233;€aÐ ° Ðstudy€of€9000€families€in€child€custody€disputes€revealed€that€33%€of€the€allegations€of€child€sexualÏabuse€were€false.)ÌÌà  àGiven€this€reality,€a€zealous€trial€attorney€should€elicit€expert€testimony€establishing€thatÏchild€testimony€is€in€fact€less€reliable€than€that€of€an€adult.€€In€this€way,€a€test€case€might€thereby€beÏcreated€to€challenge€the€admissibility€of€hearsay€statements€made€by€children.ÌÌà  àPursuant€to€Penal€Code€section€868.5,€a€complainant€in€a€case€involving€a€major€sex€crimeÏmay€be€accompanied€to€the€witness€stand€by€a€support€person.€€If€the€support€person€is€also€aÏgovernment€witness,€the€support€person€must€testify€before€the€complainant.€€(Penal€Code€sectionÏ868.5,€subd.€(c).)€€Presumably,€the€support€personððs€testimony€will€be€subject€to€exclusion€if€he€doesÏnot€testify€before€the€complainant.ÌÌà  àOn€its€face,€the€only€showing€required€by€section€868.5€is€that€a€support€person€ð ðis€bothÏdesired€by€the€prosecuting€witness€for€support€and€will€be€helpful€to€the€prosecuting€witness.ðð€Ï(Section€868.5,€subd.€(b).)€€According€to€one€court,€the€showing€in€a€child€molest€case€need€only€beÏð ðperfunctory.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€Lordóó€(1994)€30€Cal.App.4th€1718,€1722.)€€This€conclusion€is€wrong.Ð  #ð! ÐÌà  àAs€was€acknowledged€in€òòPeople€v.€Adamsóó€(1993)€19€Cal.App.4th€412,€section€868.5€mustÐ €%Ð # Ðbe€carefully€analyzed€under€the€Confrontation€Clause€since€the€presence€of€a€support€person€has€aÏsignificant€impact€ð ðon€jury€observation€of€demeanor.ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€437„441.)€€Thus,€before€a€supportÐ `'°"% Ðperson€is€allowed€to€accompany€the€complainant€to€the€witness€stand,€the€government€must€makeÏa€specific€showing€that€the€complainant€would€be€traumatized€without€the€presence€of€a€supportÏperson.€€(òòIdóó.,€at€pp.€443„444.)Ð 0*€%( ÐÌà  àObviously,€òòAdamsóó€requires€a€substantial€evidentiary€showing.€€Defense€counsel€shouldÐ ,`'* Ðalways€hold€the€prosecution€to€its€burden€of€proof.€€(But€see€òòPeople€v.€Johnsóó€(1997)€56€Cal.App.4thÐ ° Ð550,€554;€òòPeople€v.€Lord,€supraóó,€30€Cal.App.4th€1718,€1721„1722;€questioning€validity€of€òòAdamsóó.)Ð  ð ÐÌà  àOccasionally,€the€prosecutor€will€seek€to€use€the€videotaped€testimony€of€a€child.€€The€U.S.ÏSupreme€Court€has€upheld€this€procedure€so€long€as€there€is€a€showing€that€the€child€would€beÏtraumatized€if€he€was€required€to€testify€in€the€presence€of€the€defendant.€€(òòMaryland€v.€Craigóó€(1990)Ð ` ° Ð497€U.S.€836,€856„857.)€€However,€before€the€procedure€may€be€used,€the€prosecutor€must€make€anÏactual€showing€that€ð ðthe€child€witness€would€be€traumatized,€not€by€the€courtroom€generally,€but€byÏthe€presence€of€the€defendant.€€[Citations.]ðð€€(òòIdóó.,€at€p.€856.)€€Thus,€as€is€the€case€with€the€supportÐ 0 € Ðperson€statute,€defense€counsel€should€rigorously€enforce€the€evidentiary€showing€required€by€theÏlaw.Ìà  àÌà  àFinally,€it€must€be€emphasized€that€the€erosion€of€the€Confrontation€Clause€continues€on€aÏdaily€basis.€€In€at€least€one€jurisdiction,€the€òòCraigóó€rule€has€been€extended€to€cover€governmentÐ à0  Ðwitnesses€ð ðwhose€abuse€is€neither€the€subject€of€the€prosecution€nor€will€be€the€subject€of€herÏtestimony.ðð€€(òòMarx€v.€Texasóó€(1999)€528€U.S.€1034,€1035€(Scalia,€J.;€dissenting€from€a€denial€ofÐ À Ðcertiorari.)€€Given€our€historical€knowledge€that€the€Bill€of€Rights€is€constantly€under€attack,€defenseÏcounsel€should€strongly€protest€any€further€dimunition€in€the€protection€afforded€by€theÏConfrontation€Clause.ÌÌò òIX.à8  àWHENEVER€POSSIBLE,€DEFENSE€COUNSEL€SHOULD€CATEGORIZEÐ pÀ ÐAN€EVIDENTIARY€ERROR€AS€BEING€ONE€OF€FEDERALÏCONSTITUTIONAL€STATURE.ó óÐP Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAs€is€beyond€dispute,€a€claim€of€federal€constitutional€error€obtains€a€much€more€favorableÏstandard€for€harmless€error€analysis€than€does€a€claim€of€state€error.€€Moreover,€if€a€federal€claimsÏfails€on€a€state€appeal,€it€may€be€taken€to€federal€court€whereas€a€state€error€may€not.€Given€theseÏrealities,€one€of€the€primary€duties€of€defense€counsel€is€to€raise€a€claim€of€error€under€the€federalÏConstitution€if€it€is€at€all€possible€to€do€so.ÌÔ‡X¾¯XXXÔÌà  àAs€a€preliminary€point,€it€should€be€noted€that€trial€attorneys€often€fail€to€specify€that€theirÏobjections€are€being€made€under€the€federal€Constitution.€€As€a€result,€the€appellate€court€will€findÏthat€any€objection€under€the€federal€Constitution€has€been€waived.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Gordonóó€(1990)Ð °"  Ð50€Cal.3d€1223,€1254,€fn.€6;€admission€of€extrajudicial€statement€was€reviewed€only€under€theÏòòWatsonóó€standard€since€a€"federal€constitutional€right€of€confrontation"€objection€was€not€made€atÐ $à" Ðtrial.)ÌÌà  àGiven€the€appellate€courts'€inclination€to€find€waiver,€it€is€incumbent€upon€appellate€counselÏto€raise€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€trial€counsel€when€an€adequate€federal€objection€was€notÏmade€at€trial.€€In€this€way,€a€federal€claim€can€be€preserved€when€it€would€otherwise€be€lost.ÌÌà  àAs€a€final€procedural€point,€it€should€be€emphasized€that€a€claim€may€not€be€raised€in€federalÏcourt€unless€it€was€òòexpresslyóó€raised€in€state€court€as€a€federal€claim.€€(òòDuncan€v.€Henryóó€(1995)€513Ð ,`'* ÐU.S.€364,€366.)€Thus,€defense€counsel€should€be€sure€to€specifically€cite€to€both€the€federalÏConstitution€and€U.€S.€Supreme€Court€cases€on€a€state€appeal.€€Absent€such€citations,€a€federal€courtÏwill€refuse€to€entertain€the€case.€€(òòId.óó,€at€pp.€364„366;€Supreme€Court€holds€that€federal€relief€is€notÐ à Ðavailable€since€the€defendant€relied€solely€on€the€òòWatsonóó€standard€on€his€California€appeal.)Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àIn€raising€a€federal€claim€based€on€evidentiary€error,€the€constitutional€foundation€is€foundÏin€either€the€Sixth€Amendment's€Compulsory€Process€and€Confrontation€Clauses€or€the€FourteenthÏAmendment's€Due€Process€Clause.€€(See€òòCrane€v.€Kentuckyóó€(1986)€476€U.S.€683,€690.)€€Under€theseÐ @  Ðprovisions,€a€state€court€commits€federal€constitutional€error€when€it€excludes€highly€relevant€andÏnecessary€defense€evidence.€€(òòIbid.óó,€see€also€òòRock€v.€Arkansasóó€(1987)€483€U.S.€44,€53„56.)€Ð  p  ÐImportantly,€a€federal€claim€may€be€made€even€if€no€error€was€made€under€state€law.ÌÌà  àòòChambers€v.€Mississippióó€(1973)€410€U.S.€284€illustrates€this€principle.€€There,€the€defendantÐ ð@  Ðsought€to€admit€a€confession€made€by€a€third€party.€€Under€state€law,€the€confession€wasÏinadmissible€under€the€hearsay€rule.€€Notwithstanding€this€well€established€state€rule,€the€SupremeÏCourt€held€that€exclusion€of€the€confession€constituted€a€violation€of€the€Due€Process€Clause.¼à  àÌà8  à"The€testimony€rejected€by€the€trial€court€here€bore€persuasive€assurances€ofÏtrustworthiness€and€thus€was€well€within€the€basic€rationale€of€the€exception€forÏdeclarations€against€interest.€€That€testimony€also€was€critical€to€Chambers'€defense.€ÏIn€these€circumstances,€where€constitutional€rights€directly€affecting€theÏascertainment€of€guilt€are€implicated,€the€hearsay€rule€may€not€be€appliedÏmechanistically€to€defeat€the€ends€of€justice."€€(òòChambers,€supraóó,€410€U.S.€at€p.€302.)ÐP Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àòòChambersóó€establishes€a€clear€rule.€€So€long€as€the€defendant€can€demonstrate€that€he€cannotÐ 0€ Ðreceive€a€fair€trial€absent€the€admission€of€important€evidence,€the€federal€Constitution€is€implicated.€ÏThis€is€so€regardless€of€the€exact€form€which€the€evidence€takes.€€(òòRock€v.€Arkansas,€supraóó,€483€U.S.Ð ` Ð44,€56„62;€exclusion€of€defendant's€hypnotically€enhanced€testimony€was€violative€of€herÏconstitutional€right€to€testify;€òòCrane€v.€Kentuckyóó,€476€U.S.€683,€687„692;€exclusion€of€evidenceÐ ð@ Ðregarding€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€defendant's€confession€violated€his€right€to€confront€theÏwitnesses€against€him.)ÌÌà  àA€case€handled€by€SDAP€Executive€Director€Michael€Kresser€further€illustrates€theÏusefulness€of€the€foregoing€authorities.€€In€òòFranklin€v.€Henry,€supra,€óó122€F.3d€1270,€the€defendantÐ  #ð! Ðwas€charged€with€molesting€a€friend's€daughter.€€In€order€to€impeach€the€daughter's€testimony,€theÏdefendant€sought€to€introduce€her€prior€false€claim€that€her€mother€had€molested€her.€€Although€itÏfound€that€the€trial€court€had€erred€by€excluding€the€evidence,€the€Sixth€District€declared€the€errorÏto€be€harmless€under€Evidence€Code€section€354.€€(òòPeople€v.€Franklin,€supra,€óó€25€Cal.App.4th€328,Ð `'°"% Ð336„337.)€€Importantly,€the€court€failed€to€address€the€defense€contention€that€the€error€rose€to€theÏlevel€of€a€federal€constitutional€violation.€€Thankfully,€the€Ninth€Circuit€did€not€ignore€the€claim.€ÏInstead,€finding€that€"[e]xclusion€of€the€evidence€deprived€Franklin€`of€the€basic€right€to€have€theÏprosecutor's€case€encounter€and€"survive€the€crucible€of€meaningful€testing"'€[citations],"€the€courtÏreversed€the€judgment.€€(òòFranklin,€supraóó,€122€F.3d€at€p.€1273.)Ð ,`'* Їà  àAs€òòFranklinóó€shows,€a€diligent€effort€can€sometimes€yield€a€dramatic€victory.€€In€òòFranklinóó,Ð ° Ða€claim€of€evidentiary€error€was€carefully€federalized€in€state€court.€€For€reasons€unknown,€the€stateÏcourt€failed€to€acknowledge€the€federal€nature€of€the€error.€€Nonetheless,€the€Ninth€Circuit€laterÏgranted€relief.€€While€most€of€our€clients€will€not€be€as€lucky€as€Mr.€Franklin,€appellate€counselÏshould€still€use€the€case€as€an€inspirational€model.ÌÌà  àAlthough€the€law€is€much€less€certain€in€this€area,€it€is€also€possible€to€argue€that€theÏerroneous€admission€of€irrelevant€and€prejudicial€evidence€may€constitute€a€federal€due€processÏviolation.€€(See€òòEstelle€v.€McGuireóó€(1991)€502€U.S.€62,€68„70;€court€considers€such€an€issue.)€€A€caseÐ 0 € Ðfrom€the€Ninth€Circuit€provides€an€example€of€this€type€of€error.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  p  ÐÌà  àIn€òòMcKinney€v.€Reesóó€(9th€Cir.€1993)€993€F.2d€1378,€the€defendant€was€charged€withÐ P  Ðmurdering€his€mother€who€had€died€after€her€throat€was€slit.€€The€forensic€evidence€showed€thatÏalmost€any€kind€of€knife€could€have€inflicted€the€fatal€wound.€€At€trial,€the€government€presentedÏevidence€that€the€defendant:€€(1)€had€owned€a€Gerber€knife€in€the€past€(but€not€at€the€time€of€theÏcrime);€(2)€was€a€knife€aficionado;€(3)€wore€a€knife€in€the€past;€and€(4)€scratched€"Death€is€his"€onÏhis€closet€door€with€a€knife.€€After€finding€that€this€evidence€was€completely€irrelevant,€the€NinthÏCircuit€reversed€the€defendant's€conviction.ÌÌà8  à"His€was€not€the€trial€by€peers€promised€by€the€Constitution€of€the€United€States,Ïconducted€in€accordance€with€centuries„old€fundamental€conceptions€of€justice.€€ItÏis€part€of€our€community's€sense€of€fair€play€that€people€are€convicted€because€ofÏwhat€they€have€done,€not€who€they€are.€€Because€his€trial€was€so€infused€withÏirrelevant€prejudicial€evidence€as€to€be€fundamentally€unfair,€McKinney€is€entitledÏto€the€conditional€writ€of€òòhabeas€corpusóó€that€the€district€court€awarded€him."€Ð 0€ Ð(òòMcKinney€v.€Rees,€supra,óó,€993€F.2d€at€p.€1386,€fn.€omitted,€emphasis€in€original.)Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àAs€òòMcKinneyóó€makes€clear,€a€defendant€may€be€deprived€of€due€process€when€the€governmentÐ P Ðseeks€to€shore€up€a€weak€case€with€a€dose€of€highly€prejudicial€evidence.€€Thus,€in€an€appropriateÏcase,€òòMcKinneyóó€can€serve€as€persuasive€authority€in€support€of€a€claim€of€federal€error.€€(See€alsoÐ à0 ÐòòÔ_ÔGarceauÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWoodfordÔ_Ôóó€(9th€Cir.€2001)€275€F.3d€769,€773„777.)€à È àFinally,€a€clear€case€of€federalÐ Ð  Ðconstitutional€error€exists€when€the€defense€is€denied€the€opportunity€to€confront€a€governmentÏwitness€at€trial.€€Thus,€whenever€the€prosecutor€improperly€relies€on€an€extrajudicial€statement€asÏsubstantive€evidence€of€guilt,€the€Sixth€Amendment€requires€application€of€the€federal€standard€forÏprejudice.€€(òòIdaho€v.€Wright,€supraóó,€497€U.S.€805,€826„827.)ñ1 ñÐ $à" Ðñ1 ñ‡ñ2 ñÌñ2 ñò òX.à8  àREGARDLESS€OF€THE€APPLICABLE€HARMLESS€ERROR€TEST,€THEREÐ ° ÐARE€A€NUMBER€OF€FACTORS€WHICH€MAY€BE€USED€TO€SHOWÏPREJUDICE€IN€A€PARTICULAR€CASE.ó óÐàÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àAfter€handling€appeals€for€a€number€of€years,€a€defense€attorney€will€become€familiar€withÏthe€appellate€courts'€mantra€that€the€errors€were€harmless€because€the€evidence€was€"overwhelming."€ÏWhile€the€evidence€is€truly€overwhelming€in€some€cases,€the€reality€is€that€many€jury€trial€casesÏinvolve€shaky€government€witnesses,€weak€circumstantial€evidence€or€some€other€evidentiaryÏdeficiency.€€In€these€cases,€it€is€imperative€that€defense€counsel€focus€on€the€objective€factors€foundÏin€the€record€which€prove€that€the€case€against€the€defendant€was€not€overwhelming.€€Although€theÏfollowing€examples€are€not€intended€to€be€exhaustive,€they€are€indicative€of€some€of€the€factorsÏwhich€will€enable€a€defendant€to€obtain€a€reversal.Ìñ3 ñÌñ3 ñà  àAt€the€outset,€it€must€be€emphasized€that€the€primary€goal€of€defense€counsel€is€to€dissect€theÏevidentiary€weaknesses€in€the€government's€case.€€Thus,€if€a€government€witness€was€grantedÏimmunity€or€was€impeached€in€a€substantial€way,€this€point€should€be€strongly€discussed.€€Similarly,Ïif€there€were€inconsistencies€in€the€government's€case,€this€reality€should€be€amply€argued.€€Indeed,Ïany€and€all€weaknesses€in€the€government's€case€must€be€carefully€and€precisely€laid€out€for€theÏreader.ÌÌà  àBy€the€same€token,€appellate€counsel€should€also€discuss€the€strength€of€the€defenseÏevidence.€If€no€such€evidence€was€presented,€counsel€should€set€forth€the€contents€of€defenseÏcounsel's€closing€argument.€€In€so€doing,€counsel€can€hopefully€show€that€the€defense€presented€aÏrelatively€credible€theory€to€the€jury.€€If€this€goal€is€achieved,€it€will,€of€course,€make€it€very€difficultÏfor€the€appellate€court€to€legitimately€conclude€that€the€government's€evidence€was€"overwhelming."ÌÌà  àAs€a€final€preliminary€point,€it€is€important€to€note€that€some€errors€are€better€than€others.€ÏFor€example,Ô#†X¾¯XXX¾¯ ê#ÔÔ‡X¾¯XXX¾¯Ô€the€California€Supreme€Court€has€repeatedly€held€that€the€improper€admission€ofÐ P Ðuncharged€sex€offenses€is€so€prejudicial€as€to€require€reversal.€€(òòPeople€v.€Alcalaóó€(1984)€36€Cal.3dÐ ð@ Ð604,€635„636;€òòPeople€v.€Thomasóó€(1978)€20€Cal.3d€457,€470;€òòPeople€v.€Kelleyóó€(1967)€66€Cal.2d€232,Ð à0 Ð245.)€€Thus,€appellate€counsel€should€strive€to€find€those€case€authorities€which€depict€a€particularÏerror€as€being€one€which€necessarily€involves€a€high€degree€of€prejudice.€€(See€òòPeople€v.€Robbie,Ð À! Ðsupraóó,€92€Cal.App.4th€1075,€1088;€admission€of€profile€evidence€was€reversible€error€ð ð[g]iven€theÐ °"  Ðhighly€prejudicial€nature€of€the€expertððs€testimony€.€.€.€.ðð)ÌÌà  àTurning€to€the€case€specific€factors€which€may€serve€to€show€prejudice,€the€most€obviousÏindication€of€a€close€case€is€lengthy€jury€deliberations.€€(òòPeople€v.€Cardenasóó€(1982)€Ô#†X¾¯XXX¾¯´#ÔÔ‡X¾¯XXX¾¯Ô31€Cal.3d€897,Ð p&À!$ Ð907;€six€hours€of€deliberations€is€evidence€of€a€close€case;€òòLawson€v.€Borgóó€(9th€Cir.€1995)€60€F.3dÐ `'°"% Ð608,€612;€nine€hours€of€deliberations€"deemed€protracted.")€€While€the€Supreme€Court€has€indicatedÏthat€lengthy€deliberations€are€not€significant€in€a€complex€case€(òòPeople€v.€Cooperóó€(1991)€53€Cal.3dÐ @)$' Ð771,€837),€such€deliberations€in€a€short€trial€can€only€mean€that€the€jurors€found€some€deficiency€inÏthe€government's€case.€€Thus,€when€the€jury€is€troubled€by€the€case,€the€appellate€court€is€requiredÏto€take€heed.€€(òòSullivan€v.€Louisiana€óó€(1993)508€U.S.€275,€279;€harmless€error€analysis€requires€theÐ ,`'* Ðcourt€to€look€at€the€impact€of€an€error€on€the€jury;€see€also€òòPeople€v.€Filsonóó€(1994)€22€Cal.App.4thÐ ° Ð1841,€1852,€overruled€on€an€unrelated€point€in€òòPeople€v.€Martinezóó€(1995)€11€Cal.4th€434,€452,Ð ° Ðreversal€ordered€where€the€length€of€the€jury€deliberations€exceeded€the€length€of€the€evidentiaryÏphase€of€the€trial.)ÌÌà  àAnother€indication€of€a€close€case€involving€the€jury's€behavior€is€where€there€has€previouslyÏbeen€a€hung€jury.€€Obviously,€this€fact€demonstrates€that€the€government's€case€is€less€thanÏoverwhelming.€€(òòPeople€v.€Brooksóó€(1979)€88€Cal.App.3d€180,€188.)€€Moreover,€if€a€defendant€isÐ P   Ðconvicted€on€erroneously€admitted€evidence€which€was€not€presented€to€the€hung€jury,€the€inferenceÏis€virtually€compelled€that€the€evidentiary€error€is€prejudicial.€€(òòPeople€v.€Ozunaóó€(1963)€213Ð 0 € ÐCal.App.2d€338,€342.)ÌÌà  àAside€from€hanging,€a€jury€may€show€that€the€government's€case€is€weak€when€it€acquits€theÏdefendant€on€one€or€more€counts.€€In€such€a€circumstance,€an€error€relating€to€the€count€of€convictionÏshould€be€deemed€prejudicial.€€(òòPeople€v.€Eppsóó€(1981)€122€Cal.App.3d€691,€698;€òòPeople€v.Ð à0  ÐWashingtonóó€(1958)€163€Cal.App.2d€833,€846.)Ð Ð  Ðñ) ñÌñ) ñà  àEven€if€the€jury€eventually€convicts€the€defendant,€its€requests€for€additional€instructions€orÏthe€readback€of€testimony€may€establish€that€the€case€was€a€close€one.€€(òòPeople€v.€Filson,€supraóó,€22Ð  ð ÐCal.App.4th€1841,€1852;€request€for€additional€instructions;€òòPeople€v.€Pearchóó€(1991)€229€Cal.App.3dÐ à Ð1282,€1295;€"[j]uror€questions€and€requests€to€have€testimony€reread€are€indications€the€deliberationsÏwere€close.€€[Citations.]";€òòPeople€v.€Williamsóó€(1971)€22€Cal.App.3d€34,€38„40;€request€for€readbackÐ pÀ Ðof€critical€testimony.)€€Moreover,€if€the€jury€hears€an€erroneous€instruction€or€erroneously€admittedÏtestimony€for€a€second€time,€it€is€manifest€that€the€degree€of€prejudice€to€the€defendant€was€onlyÏheightened.€€(òòPeople€v.€Williamsóó€(1976)€16€Cal.3d€663,€669;€reversal€ordered€where€the€juryÐ @ Ðrequested€a€rereading€of€an€erroneously€admitted€statement€and€then€quickly€returned€a€guiltyÏverdict;€see€also€òòLeMons€v.€Regents€of€University€of€Californiaóó€(1978)€21€Cal.3d€869,€876;€rereadingÐ  p Ðof€an€erroneous€instruction€warrants€reversal;€òòPeople€v.€Thompkinsóó€(1987)€195€Cal.App.3d€244,€249„Ð ` Ð252;€erroneous€response€to€a€deliberating€jury's€question€requires€reversal.)Ìñ* ñÌñ* ñà  àRegardless€of€the€behavior€of€the€jury,€reversible€error€is€likely€to€be€found€when€the€trialÏcourt€has€effectively€precluded€the€defendant€from€presenting€his€case.€€This€is€so€since€errors€"`atÏa€trial€that€deprive€a€litigant€of€the€opportunity€€to€present€his€version€of€the€case€€.€.€.€are€.€.€.Ïordinarily€reversible,€since€there€is€no€way€of€evaluating€whether€or€not€they€affected€the€judgment.'€Ï[Citation.]"€€(òòPeople€v.€Spearmanóó€(1979)€25€Cal.3d€107,€119.)€€Thus,€when€the€trial€court€excludesÐ  #ð! Ðevidence€bearing€on€the€defendantððs€theory€of€the€case,€reversal€is€appropriate.€€(òòPeople€v.€Filson,Ð $à" Ðsupraóó,€22€Cal.App.4th€1841,€1852.)€€Ð €%Ð # Ðñ+ ñÌñ+ ñà  àIn€sex€cases,€the€erroneous€exclusion€of€impeachment€evidence€should€usually€lead€to€aÏreversal.€€If€the€complainant€is€the€sole€government€witness,€reversal€should€be€virtually€automatic.€Ï(òòPeople€v.€Adams,€supraóó,€198€Cal.App.3d€10,€19;€ð ðwhere,€as€here,€the€resolution€of€appellantððs€guiltÐ @)$' Ðor€innocence€turned€on€his€credibility€vis„a„vis€that€of€the€victim,€it€is€reasonably€probable€that€theÏverdict€would€have€been€in€appellantððs€favor€had€the€excluded€evidence€been€admitted.€€[Citation.]ðð;Ð  +p&) ÐòòPeople€v.€Randle,€supraóó,€130€Cal.App.3d€286,€293;€the€ð ðexclusion€of€the€evidence€bearing€on€theÐ ,`'* Ðcredibility€of€a€prosecution€witness€where€only€the€witness€and€defendant€are€percipient€witnessesÏhas€been€held€to€be€prejudicial€error.€€[Citations.]ðð)Ìñ, ñÌñ, ñà  àIf€an€error€impacts€in€a€strongly€negative€way€on€the€defendant's€theory€of€the€case,€reversalÏshould€also€be€the€result.€€For€example,€where€the€defendant€presented€a€diminished€capacity€defenseÏin€a€murder€case,€the€inadmissible€"statements€which€intimated€that€appellant€was€fabricating€hisÏdefense€were€most€prejudicial."€€(òòPeople€v.€Ruckeróó€(1980)€26€Cal.3d€368,€391;€see€also€òòPeople€v.Ð P   ÐWagneróó€(1975)€13€Cal.3d€612,€621;€erroneous€impeachment€of€defendant€required€reversal€since€"theÐ @  Ðresolution€of€defendant's€guilt€or€innocence€turned€on€his€credibility€.€.€.";€òòPeople€v.€Vargasóó€(1973)Ð 0 € Ð9€Cal.3d€470,€481;€òòGriffinóó€error€is€prejudicial€if€it€touches€a€"`live€nerve'"€in€the€defense.)Ð  p  Ðñ- ñÌñ- ñà  àIn€contending€that€an€error€was€prejudicial,€defense€counsel€can€often€find€a€great€deal€ofÏammunition€in€the€prosecutor's€closing€argument.€€If€the€prosecutor€placed€a€great€deal€of€relianceÏon€an€erroneous€instruction€or€an€erroneously€admitted€piece€of€evidence,€the€appellate€court€willÏhave€a€difficult€time€in€honestly€finding€that€the€error€was€harmless.€€(òòPeople€v.€Cruzóó€(1964)€61Ð Ð  ÐCal.2d€861,€868;€"[t]here€is€no€reason€why€we€should€treat€this€evidence€as€any€less€`crucial'€thanÏthe€prosecutor€„€and€so€presumably€the€jury€„€treated€it;"€see€also€òòPeople€v.€Woodardóó€(1979)€23Ð ° ÐCal.3d€329,€341;€reversal€ordered€where€the€prosecutor€"exploited"€erroneously€admitted€evidenceÏduring€his€closing€argument;€accord,€òòPeople€v.€Robbie,€supraóó,€92€Cal.App.4th€1075,€1088.)Ð à Ðñ. ñÌñ. ñà  àAs€a€final€technique€for€showing€prejudice,€defense€counsel€should€attempt€to€demonstrateÏin€an€appropriate€case€that€a€number€of€errors€require€reversal€due€to€the€cumulative€prejudice€whichÏthey€caused.€€As€our€Supreme€Court€has€recently€said,€"a€series€of€trial€errors,€though€independentlyÏharmless,€may€in€some€circumstances€rise€by€accretion€to€the€level€of€reversible€and€prejudicial€error.€Ï[Citations.]"€€(òòPeople€v.€Hill€óó€(1998)€17€Cal.4th€800,€844.)€€Thus,€even€in€a€case€with€strongÐ 0€ Ðgovernment€evidence,€reversal€may€be€obtained€when€"the€sheer€number€of€.€.€.€legal€errors€raisesÏthe€strong€possibility€the€aggregate€prejudicial€effect€of€such€errors€was€greater€than€the€sum€of€theÏprejudice€of€each€error€standing€alone.€€[Citation.]"€€(òòId.óó,€at€p.€845;€see€also€òòThomas€v.€Ô_ÔHubbardÔ_Ôóó€(9thÐ P ÐCir.€2001)€273€F.3d€1164,€1179„1180;€òòGerlaugh€v.€Stewartóó€(9th€Cir.€1997)€129€F.3d€1027,€1043;Ð ð@ ÐòòUnited€States€v.€Wallaceóó€(9th€Cir.€1988)€848€F.2d€1464,€1475„1476.)Ð à0 Ðñ/ ñÌñ/ ñà  àAfter€reviewing€the€foregoing€survey€of€the€case€law,€defense€counsel€should€employ€it€asÏa€starting€point,€not€an€end.€€Each€case€is€somewhat€unique.€€While€counsel€should€be€familiar€withÏthe€law,€it€is€more€important€to€closely€study€the€record€to€see€exactly€how€a€particular€error€affectedÏthe€dynamics€of€a€trial.€€By€being€sensitive€to€the€effect€of€an€error€in€a€particular€case,€defenseÏcounsel€can€often€prepare€a€persuasive€claim€of€prejudicial€error.ÌÌÔ#†X¾¯XXX¾¯Ë#Ôò òCONCLUSIONó óÐ `'°"% ÐÌà  àLong€ago,€the€California€Supreme€Court€acknowledged€the€truth€concerning€a€charge€ofÏsexual€assault:ÌÌà8  àð ðAs€a€matter€of€practical€observation€to€many€judges€who€have€presided€over€trialsÐ ,`'* Ðof€this€nature,€it€is€plainly€recognized€that,€notwithstanding€the€salutary€rule€that€anÏaccused€is€presumed€to€be€innocent€until€his€guilt€has€been€established€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt,€nevertheless,€to€the€mind€of€the€average€citizen€or€juror,€the€mereÏfact€that€a€person€has€been€accused€of€the€commission€of€such€an€offense€seems€toÏconstitute€sufficient€evidence€to€warrant€a€verdict€of€ððguiltyðð;€and€that€„€instead€of€itsÏbeing€necessary€for€the€prosecution€to€prove€his€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€„€inÏorder€to€secure€an€acquittal€of€the€charge,€it€becomes€incumbent€upon€the€accused€toÏcompletely€establish€his€innocence,€and€to€accomplish€that€result€not€only€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€but€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€(òòPeople€v.€AdamsóóÐ 0 € Ð(1939)€14€Cal.2d€154,€167,€overrule€don€other€grounds€in€òòPeople€v.€Burton,€supraóó,Ð  p  Ð55€Cal.2d€328,€352.)Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àRegrettably,€nothing€has€changed€in€the€many€decades€since€the€quoted€words€were€penned.€ÏNonetheless,€it€is€the€duty€of€defense€counsel€to€rigorously€press€for€the€enforcement€of€the€rules€ofÏevidence.€Without€such€an€effort,€a€defendant€in€a€sex€case€has€no€chance€at€all.ÌÌñ0 ñÐ  ° ÐÑ s ÑÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@þþ&ìàAPPENDIXˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌñ0 ñ